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Welsh politician Aneurin Bevan once remarked that “politics is a 
blood sport.”1) Although MP Bevan was referring to British politics, 
the same observation can be made about some of the political 
brawling that occurs within the American political system. In its 
simplest form the role of the out-of-power political party in the 
United States’ two-party system is that of opposition to all or nearly 
all of the majority party’s policies.2) This tactic is utilized in order to 
1) Aneurin “Nye” Bevan (1897-1960) was a Welsh Labour Party politician, party 
leader, minister in the British government and member of Parliament. He is 
considered the primary architect of Britain’s post-World War II National Health 
Service.
2) The timeframe selected to illustrate this process was a period when the 
Republican Party controlled both houses of Congress as well as the White 
House. Under those conditions they were generally considered the party in 
control of the national government while the Democrats were the out-of-power 
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erode the credibility of the majority party’s performance. The focus is 
on failure. Eventually, the American voter becomes disenchanted with 
the performance of the majority party and in a subsequent election 
shifts their support to the out-of-power party. With the defeat of the 
majority party in the election, the parties change roles and the cycle 
of in-and-out, majority or minority, oppose-or-support continues. 
Such a political dynamic was operating in full form in the period 
immediately preceding and after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 
2003.3) At that time, the Republican Party controlled Congress and a 
Republican president sat in the White House. Thus, it was only 
natural for members and supporters of the opposition, in this case the 
Democrats, to launch various attacks on the government’s policies in 
order to erode support for Republicans and to gain support for their 
own respective party. With a presidential election looming in 2004 
and the sitting president, George W. Bush, beginning to lose support 
in national polls, the stage was set for a multi-prong attack on the 
administration’s handling of both foreign policy and domestic issues. 
There was nothing unusual about this. That is the nature of the 
“blood sport” as it has been played in American politics since the 
party. In actual practice, however, the division of power between the two major 
U.S. political parties is rarely that clear cut. For example, at present (the end of 
2012), the Republican Party controls the House of Representatives whereas the 
Democratic Party controls the Senate and the White House. The general 
perception is that the Republicans “lost” the most recent election and are the 
party in decline (hence, the “opposition”) whereas the Democrats made gains 
and thus are the party whose power is in an ascendant phase - thus making 
them the “majority party” insofar as their approach to political tactics and the 
“blood sport” of political sloganeering, hyperbole, and campaigning is concerned.
3) Operation Iraqi Freedom was the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq. It 
was launched on March 20, 2003.
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beginning of the nation. 
One of the lines of attack on the government consisted of an 
attempt to undermine public support for continuing military operations 
in Iraq. As part of that strategy, various elite figures made public 
statements that collectively contributed to the construction of a 
negative narrative about the prospects for meaningful success in the 
Iraqi theater of operations.4) That there were problems occurring in 
Iraq during that period is beyond argument. Therefore, there were 
significant and continuing discussions within the government regarding 
how to turn things around. One line of reasoning from the Democrats 
was to terminate involvement in Iraq, cut our losses, and withdraw. 
The administration, however, was seeking ways to stay the course. It 
was under these conditions that a factual myth evolved which had an 
impact on these deliberations.5) 
In this paper, an attempt is made to examine one sliver of the 
extremely complex opposition narrative－a factual myth created regarding 
4) This statement should not be construed to imply that all of the public figures 
commenting on Operation Iraqi Freedom were part of a coordinated information 
operation. Also, it is worth noting that public and political support for the 
overarching “War on Terror” remained strong. However, since the Bush 
administration did a very poor job communicating to the American people the 
essential purposes of Operation Iraqi Freedom it created an opening for 
successful attack by those opposed to OIF, the administration, or both.
5) A factual myth is a powerful mixture of truth and subtle distortion. In the realm 
of politics, a factual myth has its greatest impact on “low information voters” 
that rely on public figures insofar as their opinion about political subjects is 
concerned. Only upon examining a factual myth more closely is it possible to 
discern minor discrepancies in the link between the facts and the myth. 
Therefore, the term factual myth is used to describe a non-truth that can be 
supported with true facts－n this case, the former Project 100,000 which 
permitted mental and physical “inferiors” to serve in the U.S. military. A more 
comprehensive explanation of a factual myth is provided later in this paper.
156   Robert T. Albrecht
US military operations in Iraq during the period before and after 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, this paper’s focus is on the 
American public’s beliefs regarding the quality of the US military 
personnel then serving in the Iraqi theater of operations.6) This paper 
suggests that a factual myth developed in some portions of the 
American public’s mind that the soldiers serving in Iraqi were 
mentally and/or socially inferior to their civilian American peers. The 
source of that perception in the public’s mind, in part, came from 
the public statements of some of American society’s elites. 
Initially, this paper addresses the question of whether elite opinion 
influences public opinion. A small, representative sampling of elite 
comments that had the power to shape the public opinion 
environment during the period immediately before and after Operation 
Iraqi Freedom is subsequently provided. This sampling of statements 
by various elites from different segments of society represents part of 
the construct that became a factual myth. Information produced by 
the Department of Defense (DoD) regarding the actual quality of US 
military personnel serving in the US armed forces is briefly examined 
to buttress the claim that statements regarding the inferior mental and 
social quality of then serving service members were erroneous or 
false. Then a legitimate basis is provided for the factual myth 
narrative. This was a DoD program that deliberately brought into the 
United States military mentally and physically deficient recruits who 
were derisively referred to as “McNamara’s Moron Corps” by 
6) In all cases examined during the period, when negative comments were made by 
public figures regarding the quality of the women and men serving in the US 
military, the statements generally included references to Iraq but not 
Afghanistan. 
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detractors of the program.7) Finally, in the conclusion, possible ways 
for the American public (or the political opposition) to resist factual 
myths in public discourse in the future are provided.
Whether Elite Opinion Affects Public Opinion
When it comes to opinion leadership, researchers have “… learned 
over the years that the media, elected officials, and citizens influence 
each other’s beliefs and behaviors in very complicated ways”.8) Adam 
Berinsky noted a “charitable view” in foreign policy literature in the 
early 2000s which held that the general American public relied upon 
a rational “cost-benefits” approach to develop their opinions about 
7) The program “Project 100,000” was an initiative of Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara. It ran from 1966 to 1971 and introduced into US military service 
approximately 354,000 young men who under normal circumstances would have 
been considered mentally or physically “Inferior” and unqualified for military 
service. The mentally deficient men who served in this program were officially 
referred to as “New Standards Men”.
8) D. J. Schildkraut, “The More Things Change...American Identity and Mass and 
Elite Responses to 9/11,” Political Psychology 23 (2002): 511–535. 517. 
Schildkraut reports mixed results regarding whether elites drive public opinion or 
not, citing research supporting the idea that elites shape mass opinion, but other 
studies suggest that elite opinion follows public opinion, while yet other studies 
suggest a more complex, reciprocal exchange of influence between the two 
groups, in which case a search for patterns indicating what conditions 
determines who influences who and under what circumstances is required. Foyle 
found differences between studies based upon quantitative analysis and case 
studies. Douglas Foyle, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a 
Mediating Variable,” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 142.
However, Berinsky’s more recent work refutes these differences and points to 
the legitimacy of “elite cue theory.” See A. J. Berinsky, “Assuming the Costs of 
War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict,” Journal 
of Politics 69 (2007): 975–997.
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involvement in war.9) This “rationality” perception somewhat 
dovetailed with John Mueller’s earlier idea that there is an inverse 
relationship between public support for a war and casualties - 
referred to by many as the “casualties hypothesis”.10) However, in a 
study comparing American public opinion during World War II and 
the Second Iraq War, Berinsky found that large segments of the 
population had very limited knowledge of some of the most basic 
facts of those conflicts. Instead, he proposed an “elite cue” theory to 
explain how changes occur in public opinion during a war. He 
concluded that “The mass public is rational only to the extent that 
prominent political actors provide a rational lead.”11) 
Other researchers also conclude that, “[r]esearchers have long 
recognized that Americans tend to remain uniformed about politics, 
especially foreign affairs.” And “… we know that Americans who are 
uninformed take cues from opinion leaders, and that often it is the 
interpretation of the events by elites, rather than the events 
themselves, that help shape public opinion” (emphasis added).12) 
Gaines et al, also identify “40 years of research demonstrating that 
9) Berinsky, “Assuming the Costs of War,” 975.
10) Ibid., 976. In a study of the Korean and Vietnam wars in 1973, John Mueller 
examined the relationship between public support and casualty levels, finding a 
relationship whereby public support dropped by 15 percent while casualties 
mounted from 100 to 1000 and then dropped an additional 15 percent as 
casualties climbed from 1000 to 10,000. Bruce Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent 
Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,,” 
International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992) 49. 
11) Berinsky, “Assuming the Costs of War,” 975.
12) Amy Gershkoff, and Shana Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq 
Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics 3 
(2005): 526. 
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most people possess very limited political knowledge.”13) Other 
studies, which controlled for the importance of mission success, 
further supported the idea that leadership consensus conditions public 
support for military operations.14) Finally, explaining that “[e]very 
opinion is a marriage of information and values” Zaller explained 
that information in that context referred “exclusively to the flow of 
political information in the media, including news reports, 
commentaries, and elite leadership cues” (emphasis added), while also 
referring to the findings of Philip Converse that “they [the American 
public] rely on ‘contextual information’ from elites about how 
different ideas ‘go together’ and thereby ‘constrain’ one another.”15) 
The Decline of Public Support for Operations in Iraq
In the period following Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003, a 
pessimism regarding operations in Iraq began to develop.16) Elites 
13) B. Gaines, J. Kuklinski, P. Quirk, B. Peyton, and J. Verkuilen, “Same Facts, 
Different Interpretations: Partisan Motivation and Opinion on Iraq,” Journal of 
Politics 69 (2007): 975.
14) Richard Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the 
Use of Military Force,” International Security 30.1 (2005): 150. The point here 
is that where leadership consensus is lacking, e.g., there are elites openly 
withholding support or actively opposing such actions, public opinion is directly 
impacted. 
15) John Zaller, “Information, Values, and Opinion,” American Political Science 
Review 85.4 (1991): 1215. 
16) This information is presented merely to establish the context and the facts 
regarding the factual myth about the quality of US soldiers serving in Iraq. Ray 
Eldon Hiebert found the Bush Administration using essentially the same tactics 
(“framing the issues”) that created misconceptions in the public’s mind insofar 
as the administration prior to OIF “personalized” Iraq by demonizing Iraqi 
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from various walks of life began making statements to the effect that 
further effort in Iraq was hopeless.17) The collective effect of these 
comments was a measureable reduction in the American public’s 
support for the war. This shift in support, for example, led a 
commenter to observe in November 2004, “The 18 months since the 
launching of the second Iraq war have brought home, even to its 
advocates, that the United States has a serious legitimacy problem” 
and that “skepticism had deepened” about the wisdom of involvement 
in Iraq.18) Richard Eichenberg noted: 
From the moment the war began on March 19, 2003, until major 
hostilities were declared over on May 1 of the same year, support for the 
war among the U.S. public averaged 72 percent. After May 1, support for 
the war and occupation dropped steadily. Since major combat ended, average 
citizen support of the war has been 52 percent; by June 2005, however, it 
had dropped below 50 percent.19) 
John Mueller noted in October 2005: 
The only thing remarkable about the current war in Iraq is how 
precipitously American public support has dropped off. Casualty for casualty, 
leader Saddam Hussein to justify OIF in the eyes of the American public. See 
Ray Eldon Hiebert, “Public Relations and Propaganda in Framing the Iraq War: 
A Preliminary Review,” Public Relations Review 29 (2003): 244.
17) Part of the process involved comments about the quality of the US soldiers 
serving in Iraq; these comments characterized soldiers as exploited dupes and 
victims of the Bush Administration’s international adventures. 
18) Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” 
Foreign Affairs 83.6 (2004): 18.
19) Richard Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the 
Use of Military Force,” International Security 30.1 (2005): 140.
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support has declined for more quickly than it did either during the Korean 
War or the Vietnam War. And if history is any indication, there is little the 
Bush administration can do to reverse this decline.20) 
With these comments it can be assumed that Mueller was 
conceding that his casualty hypothesis could not explain this drop in 
public support for OIF.
A Sampling of Negative Elite and Media Opinion
An examination of various media sources for the timeframe before 
and after OIF reveals a sufficient quantity of elite negative opinion 
about Iraq that could influence public opinion.21) The sources of the 
message came from various elites in American society. For example, 
producer Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 911 painted military 
recruiters as conniving while characterizing the young potential 
military enlistees as “dupes”.22) Kane found the stereotypes presented 
in Moore’s film repeatedly echoed in the mainstream media:
• In the New York Daily News, Nov. 8, 2005: “Youth from low-income 
areas are far more likely to end up in the military.” 
• In the Washington Post, Nov. 4, 2005 (page A1): “[T]he military is 
leaning heavily for recruits on economically depressed, rural areas where 
youths’ need for jobs may outweigh the risks of going to war.” 
20) John Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs 44 (2005): 8.
21) This paper focuses on elite statements only regarding the factual myth about US 
soldiers in Iraq and not other negative statements regarding OIF that may have 
been valid.
22) Tim Kane, “Stupid Soldiers: Central to the Left’s Worldview,” WebMemo, 
heritage.org, November 3, 2006, accessed January 3, 2012, 
www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/wm1244.cfm.
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• In the Los Angeles Times, Sept. 24, 2005: “The [GAO] report appears to 
support the contention that service in the military reserves is most 
attractive to young men living in low- or medium-income families in rural 
communities.” 
• And in the New York Times, Aug. 18, 2005: “Very few” of the soldiers 
fighting in Iraq “are coming from the privileged economic classes.”23)
Opposition politicians also made comments supporting the narrative 
that the US soldiers in Iraq were mostly from a poor or disadvantaged 
background. US Representative Charlie Rangel, a Democrat and 
decorated combat veteran, proposed reinstituting a military draft because 
he felt that disproportionate number of the poor and members of 
minority groups make up the enlisted ranks of the military, while 
most privileged Americans were underrepresented or absent.24) Mr. 
Rangel admitted, however, that his initial goal in making such a 
proposal was “to stir opposition to the war in Iraq.”25) 
The question about the intelligence of American soldiers became an 
issue during the 2004 presidential election campaign when US 
Senator and Democrat presidential candidate John Kerry, like 
Representative Rangel, told a group of university students, “You 
know, education, if you make the most of it, if you study hard and 
do your homework, and make an effort to be smart, uh, you can do 
23) Ibid.
24) David Halbfinger, and Steven Holmes, “A Nation at War: The Troops; Military 
Mirrors a Working-Class America,” New York Times March 30, 2003, accessed 
January 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/us/a-nation-at-war-the-troops-
military-mirrors-a-working-class-america.html?scp=19&sq=Rangel. 
25) Carl Hulse, “Military Draft? Official Denials Leave Skeptics,” New York Times, 
July 3, 2004, accessed January 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/03/us/
military-draft-official-denials-leave-skeptics.html?scp=7&sq=Rangel.
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well. If you don’t, you get stuck in Iraq” (emphasis added).26)
In March 2006, actor/comedian/author Richard Belzer and 
host-moderator Bill Maher debated the issue with Florida 
Congresswoman Illeanna Ros-Lehtinen, a Republican, on Maher’s 
Real Time with Bill Maher program. Mr. Maher, who spoke in 
support of Mr. Belzer’s contention that the troops in Iraq were not 
well informed about issues stated, “I think the point he’s trying to 
make is that a 19-year-old is in that army because he probably 
couldn’t find other employment.”27)
Eventually, in December 2005, the Department of Defense felt 
compelled to respond to the growing belief that American soldiers 
were of substandard caliber by issuing a fact sheet addressing the 
“Myths versus Facts.” The fact sheet addressed the myths of the 
general public’s perceptions that serving soldiers were of substandard 
caliber.28) 
The effect of these statements by various elites in American 
society contributed to the creation of a factual myth regarding the 
26) David Stout, “Kerry Apologizes for Iraq Remar,” New York Times, November 1, 
2006, accessed January 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/washington/
01cnd-kerry.html?_r=2&hp&ex=1162443600&en=8d19a4bd064e5354&ei=5094&pa
rtner=homepage.
27) Bill Maher, Richard Belzer, and Ileanna Ros-Lehtinen, “Belzer & Maher Calling 
Our Troops Uneducated Idiots,” last modified March 18, 2006, YouTube, 
accessed April 12, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=US&v=MlPC3Ni_fCc.
28) It is beyond the scope of this paper to closely examine primary data to confirm 
the quality of the recruits serving in the U.S. military in the 21st century. 
However, for a comprehensive analysis of those characteristics see Tim Kane, 
“Who Are the Recruits? The Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military 
Enlistment, 2003-2005,” heritage.org, 26 Oct 2006, The Heritage Foundation 3 
Jan 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/10/who-are-the-recruits-the-
demographic-characteristics-of-us-military-enlistment-2003-2005.
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characteristics of U.S. soldiers serving in Iraq that persists among 
portions of the American public to the present time.
The Origins of the Myth
In a 7 November 1967 speech to the National Association of 
Educational Broadcasters in Denver, Colorado, Defense Secretary 
McNamara announced a program for “contributing to the solutions of 
the social problems wracking our nation.” This program was Project 
100,000.29) The Secretary described it as “[a] program to salvage the 
poverty-scarred youth of our society at the rate of 100,000 men each 
year－first for two years of military service, and then for a lifetime 
of productive activity in civilian.”30) This program deliberately 
brought into military service men who previously would have been 
disqualified for mental or physical reasons. Physical deficiencies were 
identified by qualified medical doctors who applied specified criteria 
to determine a man’s physiological qualifications for service. Mentally 
deficient recruits were identified by their substandard performance on 
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). 
The Armed Forces Qualification Test31)
Since 1950, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), part of 31)
29) Speaking at the National Association of Educational Broadcasters Forty-Third 
Convention, Denver, Colorado, 7 Nov 1967. See McNamara, Robert S. “Social 
Inequities,” Vital Speeches 34 (1967): 98.
30) Ibid., 99.
31) The information in this section comes primarily from the ASVAB website of 
the Department of Defense at http://www.official-asvab.com/researchers.htm. 
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the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) has been 
used by the Department of Defense as one means of evaluating the 
potential of a person’s qualifications for military service. The AFQT 
measures verbal and math abilities. The AFQT was specifically 
created as a screening device. The scores are generated as percentiles 
ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 99. The AFQT number 
represents the percentage of examinees in a reference group that 
scored at or below that score.32) An examinee with an AFQT score 
of 99 would be in the top 1 percent of the examinee group. In the 
initial quotas established by DoD Secretary McNamara for Project 
100,000, at least 50 percent of the New Standards Quota was to be 













Source: Official website of the ASVAB 
Figure 1. AFQT Categories and Score Ranges
Accessed 24 March 2012. 
32) The reference group used is a nationally representative sample of 10,000 youth 
ages 18-23 who are administered the test. The DoD periodically updates the 
sample by administering the test to a new group in the appropriate age cohort. 
During the period in which Project 100,000 was implemented, the normative 
base was the World War II mobilization population－meaning all men under 
arms in December 1944. Janice Laurence, “Performance of the All-Volunteer 
Force,” Rand Corporation, PDF, undated, page 4, accessed March 10, 2012, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG265/images/webS0838.pdf.
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The AFQT referenced above is a part (measuring just verbal and 
math skills) of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery 
(ASVAB). Although the ASVAB is a military enlistment test used to 
determine whether an applicant is qualified for military service, it is 
also used for a variety of purposes to include use by civilian 
students and counselors for “career exploration and vocational 
guidance.”33) As such, the ASVAB provides a yardstick for 
researchers to use to compare military recruits - all of whom must 
complete the ASVAB - with the general population.
Why Project 100,000
In January 1961, President John Kennedy assumed office. 
Unemployment that year was 6.7 percent.34) In September 1963, the 
president established a task force on the subject of manpower 
conservation. The president’s creation of the task force was based 
upon his New Frontier agenda of ending poverty in America. He 
wrote, “Today’s military rejects include tomorrow’s hard-core 
unemployed.”35) The task force was composed of the heads of select 
Departments of the Executive Branch.36) They produced a report 
33) Official Site of the ASVAB, ASVAB FAct Sheet accessed on 24 Mar 2012. 
http://www.official-asvab.com/docs/asvab_fact_sheet.pdf and Milton Maier, 
William Sims, The ASVAB Score Scales: 1980 and World War II,” Center for 
Naval Analysis, July 1986,. accessed 24 Mar 2012. http://www.cna.org/research/
1986/asvab-score-scales-1980-world-war-ii.
34) Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed on March 24, 2012, 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev_yrs.htm.
35) W. Willard Wirtz, Robert McNamara, Anthony Celebrezze, and Lewis Hershey, 
One-Third of a Nation A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military 
Service, President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation, 1964, 41.
36) Its members were the Secretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz (Task Force 
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titled, One-Third of a Nation, A Report on Young Men Found 
Unqualified for Military Service.37) It was determined that one-third 
of all the young men turning 18 years of age in the nation were 
considered unqualified for military service. About half of that number 
were rendered unqualified for medical reasons while the remainder 
were unfit for military service due to mental deficiencies. A national 
survey by the task force found that of persons who had recently 
failed the mental test for military service, a major proportion of the 
young men were the products of poverty. The report further stated 
that most of those young men had inherited their poverty from their 
parents “and unless the cycle is broken, they will almost surely 
transmit it to their children.”38) 
Although the One-Third task force did not recommend utilization 
of the Department of the Defense for the purpose of manpower 
conservation, in 1964 Secretary McNamara proposed the establishment 
of Special Training Enlistment Program (STEP).39) STEP was a plan 
to annually enlist 15,000 men and to send them to special, intensive 
educational training prior to their starting basic military training. The 
program required funding by Congress, which refused; Shapley 
characterizes as evidence of the resistance of the career military to 
Chairman), Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Anthony J. Celebrezze, and the Director of Selective 
Service System, Lt. General Lewis B. Hershey. Ibid., 5. 
37) The title of the report was inspired by a statement by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt who spoke of seeing “one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, 
ill-nourished.” Ibid.
38) Ibid., 7.
39) Albert Blum, “Soldier or Civilian, The Question of Deferments,” Human 
Resource Management.,” 5., (1967): 3.
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accepting any mentally deficient recruits.40)
In response to the demise of the STEP proposal, Secretary 
McNamara ordered the lowering of AFQT standards in April 1966. 
This approach did not require Congressional approval. He announced 
the program in August 1966 and it was in operation by October of 
that year.41) 
In creating the program, Secretary McNamara established quotas 
requiring each of the military services to accept an established 
percentage of men who scored in mental group IV on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test. Previously, men in this category were 
rejected for military service. The quotas were adjusted periodically 
but for the duration of the program, the United States Army was the 
service required to accept the largest percentage of men in the lowest 
mental category (see Table 1). 
40) Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert 
McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 385. For an interesting 
overview of the political aspects of the blocking of the STEP program and 
Secretary McNamara’s response (Project 100,000), see John Worsencroft, 
“Salvageable Manhood: Project 100,000 and the Gendered Politics of the 
Vietnam War,” (MA thesis, University.of Utah, 2011), 32-36. As Shapely 
discusses, the cost for remedial training for each sub-standard recruit was 
estimated at approximately $5,000. That plus the extra time required in training 
before the recruit was minimally qualified to enter mainstream military training 
caused several high-ranking members of the military to generate significant 
resistance from within the bowels of the Pentagon. These high ranking members 
of the military used their contacts in Congress to generate considerable 
opposition to McNamara’s proposal in Congress due to the perception that the 
military was being tasked to spend DoD dollars on a program more suitable for 
some other department of the executive branch.
41) Shapley, Promise and Power, 385. 
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Table 1. Mental Group IV Quotas as a Percent of Enlisted Recruits 
by Fiscal Year (FY)42)
Fiscal Year Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force DoD Total
FY 196743) 25.9 15.0 18.0 15.0 22.3
FY 1968 24.5 17.0 21.0 17.0 22.2
FY 1969 24.0 18.0 24.0 18.0 22.1
FY 1970 24.0 18.0 24.0 18.0 22.1
FY 1971 24.0 15.0 20.0 15.0 20.5
FY 197244) 24.0 15.0 20.0 15.0 20.5
Source: Department of Defense
With the initiation of Project 100,000 the military services began 
accepting men who would have been disqualified in the past on the 
basis of failure to meet minimum mental qualifications or who had 
physical defects that were easily corrected within a short period of 
time.45) The program was referred to as Project 100,000 since the 
42) Mental Group IV personnel are those who score between the 10th and 30th 
percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, described supra. The 
allocations to the Navy and Air Force - generally considered the two most 
technically oriented services, were driven, in part, by a desire to offset the 
probability that many of the New Standards Men in the Army would find 
themselves in jobs exposing them to direct combat and the likelihood of higher 
casualty rates. Ibid., 386.
43) The fiscal year ran from July 1 to June 30 in the 1960s. For FY 1967, when 
the program was initiated, the quota was applied only from October 1966 to the 
end of the fiscal year in June 1967. 
44) July 1971 to December 1971 when the program ended. 
45) Over 80 percent of the medically unqualified men who were accepted into 
military service under Project 100,000 were either overweight or underweight 
cases. The remainder possessed one of fifteen correctable medical conditions 
such as a deviated nasal septum which was medically corrected while the man 
was in the service. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower 
and Reserve Affairs, United States, Department of Defense. Project 100,000: 
Characteristics and Performance of “New Standards Men,” Department of 
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ultimate goal was to accept 100,000 of these type of men each year. 
Between October 1966 and December 1971, approximately 354,000 
men entered the various branches of the US military under Project 
100,000. The men who were admitted to military service under this 
program who would have previously been classified as mentally 
unqualified were referred to as “New Standards Men.” 
The New Standards Men did not know that they were participants 
in Project 100,000.46) They did not know that they were part of a 
social experiment. Project 100,000 was a “blind experiment run on a 
1.5 million-member organization.”47) The DoD project director 
decided also to keep commanders of New Standards Men “ignorant 
of which men they were.” New Standards Men were identified by 
special identifying numbers in their personnel file. No one in their 
immediate chain of command knew of their status.48) Nevertheless, 
commanders and supervisors of soldiers knew that the program 
existed and when they identified a poorly performing solider, that 
soldier was considered a member of McNamara’s “moron corps.”49)
Project 100,000 was implemented by the Department of Defense in 
October 1966. The United States Congress, in the DoD 
Appropriations Act of 1972 prohibited the establishment of quotas for 
military service based upon mental categories. As a result, in 
December 1971, DoD terminated Project 100,000. 
Defense, 1969, 9. 
46) McNamara, “Social Inequities,” 102.
47) Shapley, Promise and Power, 385.
48) Ibid., 385.
49) Lawrence Baker and William Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The 
War and the Vietnam Generation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 127.
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The Outcome
In September 1968, in a speech before the National Security 
Industrial Association in Washington, D.C., then Secretary of Defense 
Clark M. Clifford called Project 100,000 “a spectacular success.”50) 
However, the facts tend to dispute the Secretary’s characterization of 
the results. The New Standards Men were admitted to military 
service via revised entrance standards that had been significantly 
lowered. Although entranced standards were lowered, performance 
standards were not.51) One general finding of an early study 
specifically focused on New Standards Men was, “a general finding 
… [of] a significant and meaningful relationship between aptitude as 
measured by AFQT and success in training.”52) It was found that 
low AFQT subjects were slower to respond to training, required more 
training time, needed more guidance and repetition of instruction. 
Although it varied by task, the low AFQT subjects required “from 
two to four times as much training time, from two to six times as 
much prompting, and from two to five times as many trials to reach 
criterion.”53) Another DoD report generated after the program ended 
provided the following statistics:54)
50) Clark Clifford, “The Defense Establishment,” Vital Speeches 35 (1968): 36.
51) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
Project 100,000, vii. This report was produced by a member of the Human 
Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) a nonprofit corporation established 
in 1969 to conduct research in the field of training and education. It is 
affiliated with George Washington University. 
52) Ibid. 
53) Howard McFann, “Progress Report on HumRRO Research on Project 100,000,” 
Presentation at Headquarters U.S. Continental Army Command Fort Monroe, 
Virginia February 1969. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/691633.pdf
54) Rand Corporation, Project 100,000 New Standards Program, Rand Corporation 
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• 94.6% of the New Standards Men completed basic training compared to 
97.5% for the control group.
• The attrition rate of New Standards Men in skill courses was 10%, 
compared to 4% for control group men attending the same courses.
• New Standards Men were more successful in courses that stressed practical 
work and did not require significant reading and mathematical abilities.
• 37% of the New Standards Men and 23% of the control group men were 
assigned to combat type skills.
• Most New Standards Men were assigned to occupations which are 
considered “soft-skill” areas in the military services. 
Of the approximately 354,000 young men who entered the service 
as New Standards Men, about 2,100 were killed in combat in 
Vietnam. That is a percentage lower than the combat casualty rate 
found in the general population then in the military service.55) One 
explanation for the lower casualty rate was that the type jobs that the 
New Standards Men qualified for were in the support or combat 
support branches of the service rather than the combat arms. 
The Factual Myth
At the time immediately before and after OIF, statements made by 
some elites regarding the mental skills of serving soldiers were not 
accurate. There is certainly truth in the statement that some American 
soldiers with significantly substandard mental capacities served in the 
Monograph MG265, PDF, undated, pages 3-6, accessed March 10, 2012,, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG265/images/webG1318.pdf.
55) Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. Dirty Secrets of the Vietnam War(New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 5. 
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United States Army. People making the claim that some soldiers 
were mentally deficient could point to Project 100,000 as one 
powerful example to buttress their claim. However, only upon closer 
examination it would have become clear to the general public that 
mentally inferior soldiers had once served and fought in combat in 
the service of their country, but only decades earlier. It did not 
justify the conclusion that contemporary soldiers were mentally 
deficient since facts existed indicating that serving members of the 
armed forces as a group were higher scoring on the ASVAB and 
higher performing by other measures than their peers in civilian 
American society.56) 
The Factual Myth and Project 100,000 
If viewed on a continuum, a factual myth would place on the 
“weaker and softer” end of a continuum of political tools available 
for use in the “blood sport” of American politics. That is because a 
factual myth relies on anticipated responses from others that 
politicians do not directly control. It is a tool for use primarily in 
the new media such as Internet-base blogs, news aggregators, Twitter, 
and other non-traditional methods for disseminating news and elite 
opinion to voters and citizens who are not stalwart supporters of a 
particular political persuasion. The basic factual myth is originally 
disseminated by public elites, but dissemination and defense of the 
myth relies on anonymous supporter-defenders throughout the Internet 
who make the correlation of the statements of the elites with the 
56) Kane, “Who Are the Recruits?” For example, the reading level of 2004 recruits 
was a full grade higher than that of a comparable youth population.
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remote, tenuous factual information. If the correlation is subsequently 
discredited, it is the Internet poster, not the elite who bears the loss 
of credibility. 
In the case of the factual myth described in this paper, it appears 
to have been a failure as measured by the results of the 2004 
general election. Although the Democrats made some gains in 
Congress, they failed to unseat the sitting Republican president. A 
review of Internet forums from the 2003-2005 timeframe shows that 
“the masses” did not begin to discuss the factual myth to any great 
extent until after the general election. This serves to reinforce the 
fact that a factual myth is not one of the more powerful tools 
available for political factions to use on a political battleground. 
Elites made statements but the message did not take among the 
masses. For this tool to serve an effective purpose, it may be 
necessary to refine the process. The continuum of political tools 
(ranging from least significant to most significant) includes: minor 
false personal statements by a politician regarding their qualifications 
or background, political hyperbole, factual myths, covert media 
coordinated messaging campaigns, overt political campaigns, cronyism, 
outright lying about significant events, cover-ups, and corruption. Of 
these political tools only corruption and under certain circumstances 
cover-ups cross the line into illegal activity. The rest of the options 
mentioned may be morally deplorable to some, but effective tools for 
persuading “low information voters” to support a particular political 
choice. 
To summarize, although not a strong tool, a factual myth, if 
employed in concert with other political tools, can serve to “flood 
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the zone” of political discourse and thus place the opposition on 
defense rather than offense. It is a low risk tool and thus multiple 
factual myths can be disseminated simultaneously. If nothing else, 
factual myths can serve as political distracters which overwhelm low 
information voters to such a degree that they tune out important 
relevant issues due to information overload. 
Conclusion
This paper established that legitimate facts exist which at first look 
seem to confirm the myth proclaimed by some elites 2003-2005 of 
the mental or social inferiority of contemporary US soldiers. Project 
100,000 and the New Standards Men were real programs involving 
real people－people who were mentally far below normal mental 
standards for Americans their age and frequently from a poverty 
background. That is the substance of a factual myth－a mixture of 
powerful truth and subtle distortion. Only upon examining a factual 
myth more closely is it possible to discern discrepancies in the link 
between the facts and the myth. 
Factual myths constitute a real threat to the successful functioning 
of a large republic like the United States since most citizens do not 
have the time to investigate carefully the facts themselves. Instead, as 
shown in this paper, many citizens rely on cues from elites to assist 
them in determining the facts upon which they make their decisions 
about the wisdom of a particular act or policy of their government. 
When elites articulate factual myths they are contributing to the 
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spread of misleading information that affects the decisions of 
significant numbers of the American public. There is only one 
practical defense to an effective factual myth and that is better, more 
precise, more timely information provided to the masses in a format 
that they can easily assimilate. Although the Information Revolution 
provides some hope insofar as countering the creation and 
dissemination of factual myths, the ease and rapidity of global 
communication also facilitates the spread of new factual myths. An 
alternative defense to this phenomena would be a “wiser” public 
capable of better critical thinking. However, members of the general 
American public may not have the time, inclination, or desire to 
attempt that choice.
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Abstract
A Factual Myth: American Soldiers, Project 
100,000, and the New Standards Men
Robert Thomas Albrecht,  JD
(Keimyung University)
The term factual myth is used to describe a mixture of truth and 
distortion. Factual myths are significant since studies show that many 
members of the general American public rely on cues provided by elites to 
determine their support or opposition to the policies and activities of their 
government. When elites disseminate factual myths they do more than 
simply repeat a half-truth. They impact the democratic choices of significant 
segments of the American population. 
Factual myths should be distinguished from opinions. Factual myths are 
statements made as fact that are non-truths. Not all non-truths rise to the 
level of factual myths, but when a sufficient number of elites parrot the 
same non-truths, a factual myth is created that once entered into the public 
mind is very difficult to change.
This paper illustrates the creation of a factual myth in American society 
in the period immediately before and following Operation Iraqi Freedom－the 
factual myth that US soldiers serving in Iraq were mentally or socially 
inferior to their peers in civilian society. Some of the people disseminating 
the factual myth probably believed its veracity because of a program 
operated several decades earlier by the Department of Defense that 
intentionally brought into military service men who were mentally 
unqualified to serve. This program, called Project 100,000 by its originator 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, brought approximately 354,000 
mentally deficient young American men into military service during the 
Vietnam War. Some of these men served honorably and well while others 
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failed. More than 2,000 of them died in combat. Many of these men, in 
their public interactions with others, unintentionally created a general 
impression of American soldiers as mentally inferior. It was an impression 
that persisted well beyond 1971 when the program ended.
Examples of elite opinion expressed in the period following Operation 
Iraqi Freedom which led to the creation of a factual myth regarding the 
quality of the soldiers serving in Iraq are provided. A review of the research 
which establishes that elite opinion influences public opinion regarding the 
public’s perception of the validity of government actions and policies is 
covered. Then the basis for the factual myth is examined－Project 100,000. 
The paper closes with suggestions for mitigating the effects of factual myths 
in the future. 
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myth, public opinion
